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I Comments I
The Propriety of Probable Cause: Why the
U.S. Supreme Court Should Protect




In 2015, a person rarely goes anywhere without his or her cell
phone. Cell phones1 have become an indispensable component of
personal and professional life. Throughout the day, a cell phone
continuously connects with service towers, called cell sites, which
change with the user's location. Service providers record the cell site
history of a customer. This history, known as historical cell site data,
automatically generates and can reveal a great deal of personal
information about a cell phone user's life by tracking his or her
movements with impressive precision.
The ubiquity of cell phones, coupled with the precision of historical
cell site data, makes service providers' records extremely useful for law
enforcement in criminal investigations. The government often uses
historical cell site data to place a suspect at the scene of a crime.
*J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2016.
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Controversially, the government is able to compel service providers to
disclose this comprehensive and personal information without having to
show probable cause.
First, this Comment discusses the disagreement among the Circuits
whether the government should be required to show probable cause,
rather than specific and articulable facts, to compel a service provider to
disclose historical cell site data. Second, this Comment urges the U.S.
Supreme Court to resolve this conflict. Third, this Comment advocates
for the Court to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell site
location information, and require a showing of probable cause before
allowing the government to compel disclosure of historical cell site
information. Finally, this Comment discusses why the Fourth
Amendment's third-party exception should not abrogate a person's
reasonable expectation of privacy in cell site information, and further
details why the probable cause standard is proper to impose on law
enforcement.
Table of Contents
I. IN TRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 253
II. UNDERSTANDING HISTORICAL CELL SITE DATA AND THE CURRENT
LEGAL LANDSCAPE ............................................................................... 254
A. Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: United States v. Jones
and R iley v. California ................................................................. 254
B. Explanation of Historical Cell Site Data ...................................... 256
C . Pertinent Legislation .................................................................... 258
1. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act ........................ 258
2. The Stored Communications Act ............................................ 258
D. The Controversy Among the Circuits .......................................... 261
1. The Fifth Circuit Chooses the Specific and Articulable
Facts Standard ........................................................................ 26 1
2. The Eleventh Circuit Originally Favors Probable Cause in
D a vis I .................................................................................... 263
3. An En Banc Eleventh Circuit Reverses, Holding the
Specific and Articulable Facts Constitutional in Davis II ...... 265
III. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT SHOULD RECOGNIZE A REASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN CELL SITE LOCATION DATA .................. 266
A . The Issue is Ripe for Decision ..................................................... 266
B. Cell Phone Users Have a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
in H istorical Cell Site Data .......................................................... 268
C. The Inapplicability of the Third-Party Exception to the
W arrant Requirem ent ................................................................... 273
D. Probable Cause Is the Proper Standard to Impose On Law
E nforcem ent ................................................................................. 277
IV . C ON CLU SION ........................................................................................ 280
[Vol. 120:1
THE PROPRIETY OF PROBABLE CAUSE
I. INTRODUCTION
Cell phone technology has fundamentally altered the way in which
people carry out their personal and professional lives.2 In contemporary
American society, 90 percent of American adults own a cell phone and
58 percent own a smartphone.3  This overwhelming majority of
Americans that own cell phones rarely part with the devices: 67 percent
constantly check their phones for messages, alerts, or calls; 44 percent
sleep with their phone next to their bed; and 29 percent say that they
could not live without their phone.
The prevalence of cell phones, as well as the near-constant
evolution of the technology that makes them function, has led many to
entrust personal and sensitive data to the memory of their devices.' This
includes photographs, text messages, and emails, as well as information
that is not user-created, like cell site location information. Notably,
automatically generated cell phone location information can reveal just
as much personal information about a user as photographs, emails, and
text messages6 and can be extremely useful for law enforcement in
solving crimes.7
Controversially, in some jurisdictions, law enforcement is currently
able to obtain cell site location information without a warrant and
without showing probable cause.8 This Comment will argue that the
more stringent probable cause standard should govern cell phone
location information collection.9 Part II will explain the logistics of cell
1. See Ira Hyman, Cell Phones Are Changing Social Interaction, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY, Jan. 26, 2014, https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/mental-
mishaps/201401/cell-phones- are-changing-social-interaction; Kristen Purcell & Lee
Rainie, Pew Research Center, Technology's Impact on Workers, Dec. 30, 2014,
http://www.pewintemet.org/2014/12/ 30/technologys-impact-on-workers.
2. See Pew Research Center, Mobile Technology Fact Sheet (2015).
3. Id.; Ira Hyman, Are You Addicted to Your Cell Phone?, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY,
Mar. 23 2013, https://www.pyschology today.com/blog/mental-mishaps/201303/ are-
you-addicted-your-cell-phone.






8. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "[i]n testing whether an office has
probable cause ... all that is required is the kind of 'fair probability' on which
'reasonable and prudent [people] act.' To evaluate whether the State has met this
practical and common-sensical standard, this Court has consistently looked to the totality
of the circumstances and rejected rigid rules, bright-line tests, and mechanistic inquiries."
Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1051 (2013) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
235 (1983)(alteration in original)(citation omitted). Probable cause is a fluid concept,
and a "flexible, commonsense standard." Gates, 462 U.S. at 239.
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phone location data and detail the major cases dealing with electronic
communications surveillance. Part II will also explain the Stored
Communications Act, the current statutory framework for obtaining a
cell phone's historical cell site data. Further, Part II will discuss the
ongoing controversy between the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits on
whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion should govern the
procurement of historical cell site data.
Part III will urge the U.S. Supreme Court to ground a future
decision on historical cell site data in the privacy theory of the Fourth
Amendment by recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell
phone location information. Part III will also argue that probable cause
is the proper standard for courts to impose on the government to secure a
court order to obtain historical cell site data. Finally, Part IV offers
concluding statements to the issues presented in this Comment.
II. UNDERSTANDING HISTORICAL CELL SITE DATA AND THE CURRENT
LEGAL LANDSCAPE
A. Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: United States v. Jones10 and
Riley v. California"
In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has begun to shape its
jurisprudence to keep pace with advancements in cell phone as well as
location and tracking technologies used by police in criminal
investigations. For example, in United States v. Jones, federal agents
attached a GPS12 tracking device to the bumper of Jones's wife's vehicle
while it was parked in a public parking lot.13 Agents acted in the absence
of a warrant to do so and tracked Jones's movement for 28 days.'4 The
U.S. Supreme Court held that attaching the GPS device to the bumper of
Jones's vehicle and the use of that device to monitor Jones's movements
constituted a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.'
5
The Court reached its decision on the common law trespass theory 6 and
9. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
10. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
11. "GPS," also known as "global positioning system," is an extremely accurate
navigation system comprised of satellites that orbit the earth and receivers on the earth's
surface. See GARMIN, What is GPS?, http://www8.garmin.com/aboutGPS (last visited
Nov. 10, 2014). The satellites transmit signals to the receivers to calculate a user's exact
location via mathematical triangulation. Id.
12. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 945.
15. See generally, Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment is not violated, in the absence of a physical trespass as recognized by
property law); Goldman v. U.S., 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (affirming Olmstead and holding
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found that, having occupied private property in order to obtain
information in the absence of a warrant, the government had conducted
an illegal search and violated Jones's Fourth Amendment rights. 
17
Just two years after rendering its decision in Jones, the U.S.
Supreme Court ook another important step toward updating its Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence in Riley v. California.18 In Riley, a police
officer conducted a search incident to arrest and seized Riley's cellphone
from his pants pocket.19 The officer searched through the contents of
Riley's phone and noticed the repeated use of a term commonly
associated with gang membership.20 Hours later at the police station, a
detective also searched the contents of Riley's cellphone.21 Based on
cellphone videos and photographs that the detective discovered on the
phone, Riley was charged with a shooting that had occurred a week
22prior.
The Court held that the officer's warrantless search of Riley's
phone was unconstitutional.23 In doing so, the Court recognized a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the content stored on one's cell
phone, and thus required, generally, that police first obtain a warrant
before searching a cell phone incident to arrest.24  The Riley Court
reasoned that cell phones are a "pervasive and insistent part of daily
life' 25 and possess the unique capability to store a great deal of personal
information26 that users expect to remain private."
It is important to underscore that the holding in Riley pertains only
to cell phone content information. Historical cell site data is considered
non-content information.2' Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court should
resolve the current controversy among the circuit courts and definitively
decide the requisite legal standard that law enforcement must satisfy to
obtain non-content information from an individual's cell phone.29 Or,
that in the absence of an unlawful entry or physical trespass there is no search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
16. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954.
17. Rileyv. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).




22. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480.
23. See id. at 2493.
24. Id. at 2484.
25. Id at 2489-91.
26. Id. at 2488-91.
27. For an explanation of non-content information, see infra note 69 and
accompanying text.
28. See Hanni Fakhoury, A National Consesus: Cell Phone Location Records Are
Private, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, July 29, 2014,
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/07/constitutionally-important-consensus-location-
2015]
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more precisely, what is the requisite legal standard that law enforcement
officials must meet in order to compel cell phone service providers to
produce a subscriber's historical cell site data under § 2703(d) of the
Stored Communications Act?
30
B. Explanation of Historical Cell Site Data
Historical cell site data31 is the record, maintained by cell phone
service providers,32 of a subscriber's calls and includes the antenna
towers used to carry the call to or from the subscriber.33 A subscriber's
network is divided into cells and has a cell tower, called a "cell site," at
the point where three cells meet.34 A cell phone constantly transmits and
receives radio wave signals throughout a service provider's network to
test the strength of every potential tower from which it can derive the
strongest signal to make and to receive calls most effectively.35 This
occurs as often as every seven seconds.36 To avoid dropping a call when
a signal from one cell site weakens, the call transfers to another cell site
with a sufficiently stronger signal.37
The proximity of cell towers to one another affects the degree of
accuracy to which data points will disclose a cell phone user's location at
the time of the call.38 Generally, cell towers are closer together in urban
privacy (explaining that Riley's general ban on searches of cell phones incident to arrest
was a response [to] the privacy implications of technology changing the societal reality,
and noting that "[t]he only thing that should now be considered unreasonable is the
government's attempt to get historical cell site data without a warrant").
29. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-9675 (2012). It is this precise
issue that shall be the focus of this Comment. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
30. Cell site data can be interpreted in real-time or historically from service provider
records to determine the location of a cell phone at any time. While real-time cell site
information itself presents interesting and similar legal issues to those presented by
historical cell site data, real-time cell site information issues exceed the scope of this
Comment.
31. See Andrew B. Serwin, M. Leeann Habte, & Jerry D. Brown, Privacy in an
Interconnected World, 28 GPSoLo 34, 35 (2011) (explaining that typically, historical cell
site data is kept by service providers for 18 months).
32. See K. Carrie Sarhangi, Riley Cellphone Search Rule is Slowly Sweeping the
Nation, LAw360, Sept. 26, 2014, https://www.law360.com/articles/577356/riley-
cellphone-search-rule-is-slowly-sweeping-the-nation.
33. See Kathryn Nobuko Horwath, Note, A Check-in on Privacy after United States
v. Jones: Current Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence in the Context of Location-Based
Applications and Services, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 925, 932 (2013).
34. See id; Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment:
A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 702 (2011).
35. See Freiwald, supra note 34, at 702.
36. See Horwath, supra note 33, at 932.
37. See Sarhangi, supra note 32. See also Freiwald, supra note 34, at 702.
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areas39 than in rural locations40 to accommodate a greater call volume.
41
As the number of data points increases, so does the accuracy with which
one is able to determine the location of a cell phone user.42 The more
accurately one is able to determine a cell phone user's location, the more
intrusive the information gleaned from the analysis becomes.
43
Particularly, when analyzed in the aggregate, data points can "reconstruct
someone's specific movements down to the minute, not only around
town, but also within a particular building"44 and even the specific
individual floors and rooms within a building.45 In fact, more precise
than GPS data,46 cell site information can track a user's location inside of
a building or residence.47
Historical cell site data is routinely recorded and maintained by
third-party telecommunication companies.48  Law enforcement officials
often seek to obtain historical cell site information to aid in criminal
investigations.49 The government almost always seeks to obtain initiation
and termination data,50 but also frequently seeks "duration data"5' as
well. 2
38. Towers are often only several hundred feet apart. See Freiwald, supra note 34, at
702.
39. It is not unusual for towers to be miles apart. Id.
40. Id. at 710.
41. Id. at 702.
42. Id.
43. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (citing United States v.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012)).
44. See Freiwald, supra note 34, at 711.
45. See supra note 11.
46. See Serwin, supra note 31, at 35.
47. See Sarhangi, supra note 32.
48. See Horwath, supra note 33, at 926 (noting that remote tracking of criminal
suspects, as opposed to the former practice of physical visual surveillance, has become
preferable to law enforcement officers conducting investigations because remote tracking
is significantly cheaper).
49. "Initiation data refers to the record of the nearest cell tower to the target [user]
when a call begins, and termination data refers to such a record when the call ends."
Freiwald, supra note 34, at 702-03.
50. Duration data are "records of location data that are generated during the duration
of the call". Id. at 704. Such data is extremely informative because it can reveal where
the cell phone user was through the duration of the call, and how long the user remained
at each location. Id. 704-05.
51. ld. at 702-03.
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C. Pertinent Legislation
1. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act53
As telecommunications and computer technology became
increasingly prevalent during the 1980s, Congress grew concerned that
under the contemporaneous tate of Fourth Amendment protections, new
forms of electronic communications were vulnerable to government
interception and private disclosure.5 4  Because jurisprudential
development lagged behind technological advancements, Congress
believed that Fourth Amendment privacy rights required legislative
protection.55 In response to its concern, Congress enacted the ECPA.56
The ECPA extended Fourth Amendment privacy protections to new
technology such as cell phones, pagers, and e-mail, and limited the
ability of third-party service providers to disclose voluntarily subscriber
information to government officials.5 7 As well, the ECPA limited the
government's ability to compel providers to disclose subscriber
information. However, because more than three decades have passed
since Congress enacted the ECPA, critics have called into question its
applicability to more advanced forms of modem communication
technology.59
2. The Stored Communications Act
60
The SCA is the second portion of the ECPA61 and protects
electronic communications62 held in storage.63 Government access to
52. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) [hereinafter ECPA].
53. See Horwath, supra note 33, at 948.
54. Id. at 948-49.
55. Id. at 948.
56. Id. at 948-49.
57. Id. at 949.
58. See generally Michael R. Egger & Tyler G. Newby, The Stored Communications
Act: A Statute Long Overdue for a Tuneup, LEXOLOGY, Oct. 26, 2011,
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=6d5b6bbb-93cd-456d-8adl
dd7ce3c5a5f6.
59. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2012) [hereinafter SCA].
60. While all three titles foster Congress's goal of extending the spirit of Fourth
Amendment protection to modem communication technologies, each title provides a
different standard the government must meet in order to compel disclosure of certain
types of electronic communication. See Horwath, supra note 33, at 948-49.
Although Titles I and III are outside the scope of this Comment, a brief explanation
of each is necessary for a thorough understanding of Title II. Title I protects the
interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications while in transit, and requires that
the government obtain a warrant based upon probable cause to believe that the targeted
communication contains evidence of a crime. See Title I of the Electronic
[Vol. 120:1
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historical cell site data is controlled by § 2703(d) of the SCA.64 Section
2703(d) requires only that the government provide "specific and
articulable facts65 showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or
other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation."66  In addition to requiring that the
communication be in storage, the Act also requires the communication
be in the possession of a provider of an electronic communications
service67  (hereinafter "ECS") or a remote computing service
68
(hereinafter "RCS").69
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522) (2012)). Moreover, Title III, known as the Pen
Register Statute, prohibits the use of pen registers or trap and trace devices to intercept
the content of electronic communications in transit. See Title III of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (2006)).
61. For the purposes of the ECPA, "electronic communications" is defined as "any
transfer of signs, signals, writings, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or
photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce, but does not include any
communication from a tracking device." 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2012).
62. Under the SCA, electronic "storage" is any "temporary, intermediate storage of a
wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and
any storage of such communication by an electronic communication' service for purposes
of backup protection of such communication." Horwath, supra note 33, at 953.
63. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
64. Distinct from the probable cause standard explained in note 8 above, the U.S.
Supreme Court has stated that the specific and articulable fact standard, known also as
reasonable suspicion, "is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires
showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528
U.S. 119, 122 (2000). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) ("[I]n justifying the
particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant
that intrusion.").
65. Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-508,
100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712) (2012)).
66. "[A]ny service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire
or electronic communications." Horwath, supra note 33, at 953.
67. "[T]he provision to the public of computer storage or processing services by
means of an electronic communications system." Id. at 953.
68. Whether a service provider is classified as an ECS or an RCS depends upon the
service provided at a particular time. Id. If the service provider does not qualify as RCS
or ECS, the Fourth Amendment's traditional warrant requirement applies rather than the
specific provisions of the SCA. See Horwath, supra note 33, at 953; MATTHEW BENDER
& COMPANY, INC., LEXIsNEXIS GROUP, PRIVACY LAW AND THE USA PATRIOT ACT-
THE "CELL SITE DATA" CASES: CELLULAR TELEPHONES AS MOBILE TRACKING DEVICES,
AND SEARCHES INCIDENT TO ARREST OF CELL PHONES, 4.18 § 216, at 1 (2014).
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Historical cell site data is considered stored, non-content
information.7 °  In order to compel non-content information, the
government has several options. As always, the government may secure
a search warrant by a showing of probable cause7' or obtain the
subscriber's consent.72 Additionally, the government may obtain a court
order (hereinafter "2703(d) order") pursuant to the lesser "specific and
articulable facts" standard of § 2703(d).73
Not surprisingly, subscribers are generally unwilling to consent to
disclosing personal information to law enforcement officials, especially
in the absence of a warrant. Moreover, law enforcement may find it
difficult to satisfy the probable cause standard to obtain a warrant,
particularly during the beginning stages of an investigation.74
Accordingly, officers often seek to obtain subscriber information by
obtaining a 2703(d) order from a federal magistrate judge because
§ 2703(d) imposes a less exacting standard than probable cause.75
Federal courts have generally approved requests for 2703(d) orders on
the theory that, because subscriber cell site information is in the
possession of a third-party service provider, such information falls under
the third-party exception76 to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement.77
69. "Non-content" information is defined as "information about the communication
that the network uses to deliver and process the content information." Horwath, supra
note 33, at 953 (quoting Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to The Stored Communications
Act, and A Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1208, 1228
(2004)). "Content" information is defined as "any information concerning the substance,
purport, or meaning of that communication" and "the communication that a person
wishes to share or communicate with another person." Id.
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(A).
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(C).
72. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(B).
73. In fact, it is suggested that law enforcement officials may use historical cell site
information to bolster otherwise shaky suspicions that would not otherwise meet the
probable cause threshold. Law enforcement has the tail wagging the dog, so to speak.
See Ken Wallentine, Cell Site Location Evidence: A New Frontier in Cyber-Investigation,
2 AELE Mo. L. J. 401, 408 (2011) (noting that "[h]istorical cell site location information
will continue to provide valuable leads" in criminal prosecutions).
74. Instead of probable cause, § 2703(d) only requires law enforcement to
demonstrate "specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation." See
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
75. The third-party exception to the warrant requirement provides that a person
cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information that they voluntarily
expose to third parties; accordingly, the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement does
not apply. See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); U.S. v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435 (1976).
76. See Serwin, supra note 31, at 36.
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D. The Controversy Among the Circuits
1. The Fifth Circuit Chooses the Specific and Articulable Facts
Standard
In 2010, the Fifth Circuit opined on the proper legal standard
necessary to compel historical cell site information78 in In re Application
of the United States of America for Historical Cell Site Data.79 In this
case, the government applied for three 2703(d) orders to compel
disclosure of 60 days of historical cell site data as well as subscriber
information for the cell phones relating to three separate criminal
investigations.8 0  The federal magistrate judge81 denied the requests to
compel disclosure of historical cell site data82 and concluded that
compelled warrantless disclosure of cell site data offends the Fourth
Amendment. 83
The district court similarly denied the Government's applications
and held 2703(d) orders unconstitutional per se.84 The district court
reasoned that the "specific and articulable facts" standard accompanying
§2703(d) orders "was unconstitutionally low" 85 given the advanced state
of cell phone technology and historical cell site data's ability to reveal
77. The Fifth Circuit was not the first federal circuit to render a decision on the issue;
however, because this Comment focuses on the clear disagreement between the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits, these additional opinions are beyond the scope of this Comment. See,
e.g., In re United States for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commun. Serv. to
Disclose Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 319 (2010) (holding that the SCA gives a
magistrate discretion in whether to require a showing of probable cause prior to issuing a
2703(d) order, but this discretion should be used sparingly in light of Congress's
intention to avail 2703(d) orders to the government upon the lesser "specific and
articulable facts" showing alone).
78. In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600
(5th Cir. 2013) [hereinafter Cell Site Data: Appeal].
79. See In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F.
Supp.2d 827, 829 (S.D. Tex. 2010) [hereinafter Cell Site Data: District Court].
80. A United States magistrate judge is a judicial officer of the court and exercises
the jurisdiction of the district court. Jurisdiction is conferred on the magistrate judge by
the district judge as well as by statutory delegation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. In criminal
proceedings, a magistrate judge's duties generally include: accepting criminal
complaints; issuing arrest warrants and court summonses; issuing search warrants;
conducting initial appearances and preliminary hearings; setting bail; and appointing
counsel, among other duties. See Felix Recio, Tanner Neidhardt & Brianna Bassler, Who
is the Magistrate Judge? Litigating Before U.S. Magistrate Judges in District Courts, 41
ADvoc. 40,43 (2007).
81. See Cell Site Data: District Court, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 846.
82. It is important to note, however, that the magistrate judge's decision did not rule




PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
detailed and personal information about an individual. 6 Accordingly,
the court declared that the government could only compel disclosure of
historical cell site information by securing a warrant based upon probable
cause.
87
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit disagreed.88 The court held that
[t]he SCA's authorization of § 2703(d) orders for historical cell site
information if an application meets the lesser 'specific and articulable
facts' standard, rather than the Fourth Amendment probable cause
standard, is not per se unconstitutional. As long as the Government
meets the statutory requirements, the SCA does not give the
magistrate judge discretion to deny the Government's application for
such an order."
As an initial matter, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district
court's determination that a magistrate judge has discretion to require a
showing of probable cause based on the plain language of the Stored
Communications Act.90 Rather, the Fifth Circuit concluded:
To obtain an order for the historical cell site records of a particular
cell phone owner, the Government may apply to a court that has
jurisdiction. And that court must grant the order if the Government
seeks an order (1) to 'require a provider of electronic communication
service or remote computing service' (2) 'to disclose a non-content
record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer
of such service' when the Government (3) meets the 'specific and
articulable facts' standard. If these three conditions are met, the court
does not have the discretion to refuse to grant the order.
91
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the "shall issue" contained in
§ 2703(d) requires the magistrate judge to grant the government's request
for a 2703(d) order if all of the necessary conditions in the SCA are met,
thereby eliminating any possibility of magisterial discretion.
92
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit stated that treating historical cell site
data as tracking information was improper,93 instead deciding that the
third-party exception to the warrant requirement94 was the proper
85. Id. at 835.
86. See Cell Site Data: District Court, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 845.
87. See Cell Site Data: Appeal, 724 F.3d at 615.
88. Id. at 615.
89. Id. at 606.
90. Id. at 607 (interpreting the language of 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)).
91. Id.
92. See Cell Site Data: Appeal, 724 F.3d at 615.
93. For a discussion questioning the applicability of the third-party doctrine to
historical cell site data, see infra Part III.C.
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analytical approach to employ.95 Through this approach, the court
concluded that "cell site information is clearly a [third-party] business
record"96 owned by the service provider and that a cell phone service
subscriber knowingly and voluntarily conveys it to the service provider.97
Accordingly, the government may require that the service provider
disclose this information to the government based on a standard less than
probable cause.98
2. The Eleventh Circuit Originally Favors Probable Cause in
Davis I
In June 2014, the Eleventh Circuit created a clear conflict with the
Fifth Circuit by rendering its decision in United States v. Davis.99 The
Davis case originated as an appeal following a multi-count conviction of
Quartavius Davis.100 Davis's chief contention was that the trial court's
denial of his motion to suppress and its decision to admit location
evidence based on historical cell site data that the prosecution obtained
without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.1 '
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that cell site location information is
within the subscriber's reasonable expectation of privacy under the
94. See Cell Site Data: Appeal, 724 F.3d at 610.
95. "Business records" are defined as "records of transactions to which the record-
keeper is a party." Id. at 611.
96. Id. at 613. The court believed that cell phone users today understand that their
cell phones need to send a signal to a tower in order to maintain service. Id Moreover,
even if a cell phone user were unaware of the manner in which a cell phone "pings" off of
surrounding towers, the contractual terms of service as well and the terms of a service
provider's privacy policy clearly state that the provider uses and maintains historical cell
site data to connect phone calls and to maintain service. Id. Furthermore, a subscriber
chooses to use a cell phone and a particular service provider. Id. at 614.
97. Id. at 611. The court noted that a cell phone service provider creates a record of
its users' historical cell site information for its own business purposes and not for the
purpose of tracking the private phone calls. Id. at 610. The court further stated that it is
the party who owns the records rather than the party whose information is being recorded
that has standing to challenge a 2703(d) order. Id. (citing SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc.,
467 U.S. 735, 743 (1984)).
98. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2014)[hereinaftler Davis 1],
vacated, 785 F.3d 498 (1 lth Cir. 2015)(en banc)[hereinafter Davis 1H].
This Comment asserts that the Eleventh Circuit's en banc rehearing of this issue
underscores the importance and uncertainty courts presently face and in deciding the
proper Fourth Amendment protection to afford historical cell site information. Moreover,
because the Eleventh Circuit vacated its well-reasoned initial decision, the confusion in
the legal sphere has only intensified. Accordingly, federal courts are yearning for the U.S.
Supreme Court to provide them with clear guidance on this issue.
99. See Davis 1, 754 F.3d at 1205.
100. Id.
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Fourth Amendment.10 2  Accordingly, the court held that law
enforcement's obtainment of that data without a warrant based upon
probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment. 103 The court specifically
stated that "the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures shields the people from warrantless interception of
electronic data or sound waves carrying communications."'
0 4
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the U.S. Supreme Court's recent
decision in Jones extended Fourth Amendment protection to
electronically transmitted location information. However, because Jones
was narrowly decided on trespass theory0 5 grounds, the question of
whether Davis's cell site location information was similarly protected, in
the absence of any physical trespass, required additional analysis. 106 For
guidance, the Court turned to the concurring opinions of Justices
Sotomayor and Alito in Jones and employed the privacy theory'0 7 of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 1
08
Specifically, the Court relied on Justice Sotomayor's opinion and
her endorsement of the privacy theory as a second acceptable method of
analyzing electronic data searches.10 9 Although Sotomayor agreed with
the Jones majority to resolve the case on narrower and less controversial
grounds,l l° Justice Sotomayor clarified that "in cases involving even
short-term monitoring, some unique attributes of GPS surveillance
relevant to the Katz [reasonable expectation of privacy] analysis will
require particular attention.""'
In addition to the words of Justice Sotomayor, the Eleventh Circuit
also relied on the concurring opinion of Justice Alito, who adamantly
stated that the Court should have reached its decision on privacy theory
grounds alone. 12 Finally, in further support of its decision, the Eleventh
Circuit noted that even majority opinion in Jones (written by Justice
101. Id. at 1215.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1213.
104. See supra note 15.
105. See Davis, 754 F.3d at 1214.
106. See generally, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the
common law trespass theory set forth in Olmstead and Goldman is no longer controlling;
that a physical trespass has no constitutional significance on whether the government has
conducted a search; and that whether a search has occurred depends on whether the
government has violated an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy that society
also recognizes as reasonable).
107. See Davis, 754 F.3d at 1214-15.
108. Id. at 1215.
109. Id.
110. Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012)).
111. Id. at 1215. It is also worth noting that Justice Alito's view garnered the
support of four other members of the Court. Id.
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Scalia) did not explicitly reject the applicability of the privacy theory
because Justice Scalia had explicitly stated that "situations involving
merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would
remain subject to the Katz privacy analysis."'
' 13
3. An En Bane Eleventh Circuit Reverses, Holding the Specific
and Articulable Facts Constitutional in Davis II
After rehearing the case en bane in May 2015, however, the
Eleventh Circuit vacated its Davis I decision, agreeing with the Fifth
Circuit that the SCA's specific and articulable fact standard is
constitutionally sufficient.114 In vacating its earlier decision, the court
reasoned that cell site data fell under the third-party exception to the
warrant requirement as a business record independently comprised and
maintained by a third-party.15 Moreover, the court likened a 2703(d)
order to a subpoena, which is governed by a more lax standard than
probable cause.'
1 6
4. A Fourth Circuit Decision Recreates the Circuit Split, Holding
that the Fourth Amendment Requires the Government to Show Probable
Cause
Although there is no longer discord between the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits specifically, subsequent decisions by other federal courts
recreate and intensify the uncertainty regarding Fourth Amendment
protection for historical cell site information. For example, this past
August, the Fourth Circuit decided United States v. Graham"7 and held
that, without first showing probable cause, the government's warrantless
procurement of cell site data for an extended period of time violates the
Fourth Amendment. Importantly, the Fourth Circuit expressly declined
to follow the Eleventh Circuit's Davis II decision and rejected its third-
party doctrine rationale."8 Furthermore, unlike the Eleventh Circuit, the
court distinguished cell site data from other business records because,
unlike bank records and telephone numbers, cell site data automatically
112. Davis, 754 F.3d at 1215 (quoting Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953) (first emphasis
added).
113. See Davis 11, 785 F.3d at 500, 511.
114. Id. at 513-15.
115. Id. at 517.
116. United States v. Graham, Nos. 12-4659, 12-4825, WL 4637931 (4th Cir. Aug.
5, 2015).
117. SeeU.S.v. Graham, WL 4637931 at *13, *16-*18.
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generates regardless of whether the user is an "active and voluntary
participant." 9
III. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT SHOULD RECOGNIZE A REASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN CELL SITE LOCATION DATA
In light of the disagreement between the Circuits discussed above, a
cloud of confusion continues to hover over the proper standard that the
government must meet in order to secure a 2703(d) order. As a result,
federal circuit courts are hearing and rehearing cell site data cases.
20
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decisions in Jones and Riley
exacerbate the present uncertainty among the Circuits because neither
case addressed non-content cell phone information or tracking devices in
the absence of a physical trespass.
In light of this confusion, this Comment argues for the U.S.
Supreme Court to resolve the present controversy by providing a
definitive standard to guide courts and prosecutors. Specifically, this
Comment asserts that, based on its decisions in Jones and Riley, the
Court should hold probable cause as the proper standard that law
enforcement must satisfy in order to obtain a 2703(d) order to compel
disclosure of historical cell site information. As this Comment will
argue, the Court should rely on the privacy theory in reaching this
conclusion. Finally, this Comment contends that the third-party doctrine
does not abrogate a cell phone user's reasonable expectation of privacy
in historical cell site data, thereby preserving the propriety of requiring
law enforcement to demonstrate probable cause prior to obtaining such
data.
A. The Issue is Ripe for Decision
For there to be consensus or uniformity among federal courts as to
the constitutional protection to afford cell site data, the U.S. Supreme
Court must grant certiorari and rule on this increasingly complex and
important issue. The discrepant treatment of government requests to
compel historical cell site data has created a morass of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.'2' The absence of clear constitutional rules
to protect privacy in electronic communications leaves the degree of
protection to which a person is entitled dependent upon their
118. Id. at *17.
119. See supra Part II.D.
120. See Zachary Ross, Note, Bridging the Cellular Divide: A Search for Consensus
Regarding Law Enforcement Access to Historical Cell Data, 35 CARDOzO L. REv. 1185,
1187-88 (2014).
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geographical location.122  While the uncertainty of the proper Fourth
Amendment protections for historical cell site data leaves cell phone
users vulnerable to invasive law enforcement practices, this uncertainty
also properly sets the stage for an imminent review of this issue by the
Court.
The Court itself has evinced an eagerness to address novel
technological Fourth Amendment issues in its Jones and Riley
decisions.123  Jones illustrates that the Court is prepared to limit the
government's latitude in conducting investigations using electronic
surveillance 24 and Riley evinces the Court's sensitivity to the private
nature of cell phone information. These recent decisions show that the
Court's current trajectory trends toward declaring the specific and
articulable fact standard of § 2703(d) unconstitutional.125  Until the
present controversy arose between the Circuits, however, the Court has
lacked the opportunity to do so.
126
The Court should update its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the
near future, or risk creating a permanent lag between the Fourth
Amendment and the vast technological changes that have occurred since
it rendered many of its landmark Fourth Amendment decisions.
127
121. See Elizabeth Elliott, Comment, United States v. Jones: The (Hopefully
Temporary) Derailment of Cell site Location Information Protection, 15 Loy. J. PUB. INT.
L. 1, 35 (2013)(noting that the ability of cell phones to cross state lines and the different
standards being applied in different geographic locales is inconsistent and unworkable in
the long term); Horwath, supra note 33, at 935 ("[W]e need clear and strong rules to
protect the privacy of our electronic communications."); R. Craig Curtis, Michael C.
Gizzi & Michael J. Kittleson, Using Technology The Founders Never Dreamed Of: Cell
Phones as Tracking Devices and the Fourth Amendment, 4 U. DENY. CRIM. L. REv. 61,
89 (2014)(noting that police and judges in different jurisdictions are unsure of what they
can and cannot do).
122. See Curtis, supra note 117.
123. See Brian L. Owsley, The Fourth Amendment Implications of the Government's
Use of Cell Tower Dumps in its Electronic Surveillance, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 44
(2013). See also Mark R. Killenbeck & William Johnson, The Dog that Did Not Bark?,
62 VAND. L. REv. 407, 409 n. 11 (2009)(highlighting that the Court's willingness to place
restriction on government investigations of this sort is most strongly shown in the fact
that the Jones decision was "a unanimous decision from an oft divided Court").
124. See Sarhangi, supra note 32 (emphasizing "Chief Justice John Roberts' theme
in Riley that the Fourth Amendment needs to be reconsidered in light of today's ever-
changing technological world").
125. See Sarhangi, supra note 32 ("Although there seem to be inroads to declaring
the SCA unconstitutional, the issue has yet to be teed up before the post-Riley Supreme
Court.")
126. See Horwath, supra note 33, at 928 ("Current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
is outdated and will soon be overwhelmed."); Serwin, supra note 31, at 35 (noting that
technological developments significantly outpace their jurisprudential counterparts). See
also Audio file: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Electronic Communications
Privacy Act: Promoting Security and Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, at 88:30-
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Additionally, whereas here, there is disagreement regarding the statute's
constitutionality, "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is. ' ' 128 Indeed, the court should
fulfill its role as defender of the Constitution and use judicial review to
assure law enforcement's compliance with an individual's Fourth
Amendment rights. 1
29
B. Cell Phone Users Have a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in
Historical Cell Site Data
Contrary to its approach in Jones, the U.S. Supreme Court should
squarely confront the issue of whether Fourth Amendment protections
apply to historical cell site data on privacy theory grounds.130  By
synthesizing its Jones and Riley13 1 decisions, the Court should recognize
a reasonable expectation of privacy in non-content information, such as
historical cell site data.132 Although the Court once commented that "the
judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment
89:10 (2010)(oral statement of Brad Smith, Esq., General Counsel of Microsoft
Corporation)(stating that if the Court waits too long to render a decision, the Court risks
that the "Fourth Amendment will never really catch up"),
http://www.senate.gov/fplayers/ConmnPlayer/commFlash
Player.cfro?fn=judiciary0922 1 0&st-xxx.
127. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). Opposing this view, some would
argue that imposing a standard different from that currently required by § 2703(d) is most
appropriately a job for the legislature; however, given the current state of gridlock in
Congress, the prospect of legislative change is quite unlikely. See Freiwald, supra note
34, at 687 (noting that "[h]istorically, Congress has dragged its heels in protection
communications privacy until the courts have demanded it"). See also Elliott, supra note
117, at 35 (noting that proposed bills on this issue have failed to pass Congress, given its
present state).
128. Erin Murphy, Back To The Future: The Curious Case of United States v. Jones,
10 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 325, 339-40 (2012).
129. See Horwath, supra note 33, at 934. "By basing their holding in property-based
[trespass] theory, the [Jones] majority sidestepped the larger issue of whether the
government's use of a GPS device to monitor movements of the target's vehicle for
twenty-eight days violated his reasonable expectation of privacy." Id.
130. Where the Court recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phone
content information in the context of searches incident to arrest, thus requiring law
enforcement o secure a warrant upon probable cause. See supra Part II.A.
131. See Elliott, supra note 117, at 35. Also, note the distinction between content
and non-content information as it related to the confusion surrounding privacy
protections for historical cell site data. The distinction originated in the Stored
Communications Act in 1986-prior to the advent of new communications, like cell
phones, which challenge whether there is any existing utility and practicality of this
dichotomy. See Freiwald, supra note 34, at 740. Also note that the Court's holding in
Riley extends only to cell phone content information, like text messages, and not to non-
content information, like historical cell site data-further emphasizing the necessity and
importance of a declaration by the Court extending protection beyond just content
information.
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implications of emerging technology before its role in society has
become clear,"'133 the role of cell phones in contemporary society is
manifest and unequivocal.134 Accordingly, like GPS data,131 obtaining
historical cell site data without a warrant should constitute a search under
the Fourth Amendment136 because, in 2015, a person undoubtedly has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in such information.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures" by requiring the government to obtain a warrant
issued upon probable cause before conducting a search or seizure.1
37
Additionally, it is well settled that when the "government violates a
subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable,"
the government conducts a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.138 In other words, according to this privacy theory of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, society as a whole and a particular
individual must have an expectation of privacy in order for such an
expectation to be reasonable and deserve Fourth Amendment
protection.
39
In the year 2015, society would not merely adjudge a privacy
expectation in cell site location data as reasonable, but rather, would
consider such a claim blatantly obvious.14 As stated above,141 cell phone
132. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010)(considering the
reasonable expectation of privacy a police officer had in pager messages transmitted on a
employer-owned device).
133. See supra Part 1; infra note 143.
134. For a discussion of the similarities between GPS and cell site data, see infra
notes 157, 186-191 and accompanying text.
135. See Elliott, supra note 117, at 3 (taking this argument one step further and
submitting that "obtaining cell site data, whether historical or prospective, should
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, just as installing a GPS tracking device
does").
136. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
137. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (1967)(Harlan, J., concurring).
138. The focus of this Comment is primarily the objective prong to the Katz privacy
test since that is the more contentious issue.
139. Many critics of the privacy theory complain that the reasonable expectation of
privacy test is inconsistent in its application as a result of its ability to change with
societal expectations. See Curtis, supra note 117, at 78. Essentially, critics argue that
drawing the line between reasonable and unreasonable expectations of privacy is
arbitrary because of varying expectations of privacy in individuals across the population.
Id. While this argument perhaps has some merit in the context of novel technology, that
is simply not the case with widespread and well-established cell phone technology.
This Comment reminds critics that in many cases, as here, legal standards become
outdated with the passage of time and evolution of technology. For instance, when
Congress passed the SCA in 1986, there were 1531 cell sites, and at the end of 2013 there
were 304,360. See CTIA-The Wireless Association, Annualized Wireless Industry
Survey Results-December 1985 to December 2013 (2014) http://
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usage is pervasive in contemporary American society. 142 Moreover, cell
phone usage has gone beyond being merely a personal choice, as an
increasing number of Americans are required to use one for their
professional obligations.143 Given that cell phone usage "is not only
commonplace, it is becoming increasingly necessary to fully participate
in society today[,]"'44 a person almost always has his or her cell phone
nearby45  and often inside his or her residence- where privacy
expectations tend to be the greatest. 146 Further aggravating the situation,
the information that the government is able to obtain via cell site data is
significantly more invasive than the information gleaned by GPS
devices.147  Additionally, in stark contrast to GPS devices, cell site
information automatically generates without the government having to
attach a device.
These intimate details that are potentially revealed by a person's
historical cell site information although not specifically contemplated by
the Founding Fathers,48 is precisely the type of information that the
Founding Fathers sought o protect from government intrusion.149 As
one scholar stated, the "deep reservoirs of information ... collected by
www.ctia.org/docs/default-source/Facts-Stats/ctia-surveyye_2013_graphics-
final.pdf?sfvrsn=2. Further, the SCA passed prior to the advent of the internet. See
Horwath, supra note 33, at 953. This Comment stands by its position that in light of the
rapid and continuous evolution of modem technology, adaptability is critically important.
140. See supra Part I.
141. See supra Part I.
142. See Elliott, supra note 117, at 34.
149. See Horwath, note 33, at 927; Sara E. Brown, Note, An Illusory Expectation of
Privacy: The ECPA is Insufficient to Provide a Meaningful Protection for Advanced
Communication Tools, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 277, 305-06 (2011).
150. Ninety-one percent of people keep their phone within three feet of themselves
24 hours a day. See Mary Meeker, David Joseph & Richard Ti, Morgan Stanley,
Technology/lInternet Trends, Oct. 18 2007, http://www. slideshare.net/misteroo /web2-
139178. See also supra notes 2, 3 and accompanying text.
151. See Horwath, supra note 33, at 944-45 (quoting Cell Site Data, 747 F.Supp. 2d,
at 840). But see Kyle Malone, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and The Stored
Communications Act: Why the Warrantless Gathering of Historical Cell Site Location
Information Poses No Threat to To Privacy, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 701, 735 (2012)(arguing
that many of the locations detected by cell site data are unprotected by the Fourth
Amendment because a person does not have a privacy expectation in locations where
they are observed by a law enforcement official located in an area where that official is
legally entitled to be).
152. See Horwath, supra note 33, at 945. But see Malone, supra note 147, at 737-
738(arguing that here is no governmental intrusion even when a person is within his or
her home because historical cell site data is not able to convey one's location with
complete accuracy, therefore creating only a higher probability rather than absolute
certainty of a person's location).
145. See Horwath, supra note 33, at 966.
153. See Horwath, supra note 33, at 966.
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third-party service providers today... are the modem iteration of our
'papers and effects."' '15 Indeed, to deny Fourth Amendment protection
to historical cell site data would be to ignore the essential role that cell
phones now play in the lives of 21st century Americans. 51  And
considering the prototypical American reverence for "Life, Liberty, and
the pursuit of Happiness,,152 it is antithetical to condition participation in
American society and the workforce on the government's ability to track
a person's location at all times. 153
For the reasons just discussed, it no longer makes sense for the
confines of the home1 54 or non-existent telephone booths'55 to define the
scope of Fourth Amendment privacy protections. Besides being
impractical and nonsensical to adhere to century-old notions of privacy
protections under the Fourth Amendment, society is eminently prepared
to recognize the reasonableness of a privacy expectation in a person's
cell site location information.
In light of the current circuit split and the reasons discussed above,
the time has come for the U.S. Supreme Court to adjust its Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence to better account for technological
advancements and to adhere to spirit of the Amendment's protections as
envisioned by our Founding Fathers. The time has come for the Court
should officially recognize that Americans have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in their cell phone location information.
56
154. See Jim Harper, Reforming Fourth Amendment Privacy Doctrine, 57 AM. U. L.
REv. 1381, 1402 (2008).
155. See Freiwald, supra note 34, at 744-45. It is also helpful to consider a few
statistics illustrating how cell phone users regard their location information. For instance,
73% of cell phone users that participated in a recent survey were in favor of "a law that
required the police to convince a judge that a crime has been committed before obtaining
location information from the cell phone company." See Jennifer King & Charles Jay
Hoofnagle, Research Report: A Supermajority of Californians Supports Limits on Law
Enforcement Access to Cell Phone Location Information 8-9 (Apr. 18,
2008)(unpublished manuscript),http://ssm.com/abstract=1137988. Additionally, 72% of
users favored a law requiring the police to give notice to the user before the police obtain
historical cell site data. Id.
143. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para 2. (U.S. 1776).
144. See Curtis, supra note 117, at 91; Freiwald, supra note 34, at 743-45
(201 1)(contending that most cell phone users would be surprised and outraged to learn
that the government could access their location information without first obtaining a
warrant issued upon probable cause, especially considering that the government is
required to obtain a warrant in order to bug their conversations, phone calls, or to conduct
video surveillance).
146. Id. at 947.
147. See Freiwald, supra note 34, at 745 (reminding that there are no more phone
booths in American society so to deny Fourth Amendment protection to historical cell
site data would be to ignore the essential role that mobile telephones now play in the lives
of 21 st century Americans).
148. See Curtis, supra note 117, at 90.
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In fact, in recent years, the Court has indicates its willingness to
recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in historical cell site data
but has simply lacked the proper circumstances to do so in the past.
Although the Court declined to recognize a reasonable expectation of
privacy in electronic surveillance data in Jones,'57 the Court nevertheless
acknowledged a shift in the reasonable expectation of privacy for modem
surveillance technology158 and indicated that the resurgence of the
privacy theory is on the horizon. Most notably, a significant portion of
the Jones Court decided not to acquiesce to Justice Scalia's majority
opinion,59 and resolved the case on trespass theory grounds. While
Justice Scalia's opinion, as the majority, certainly carries legal force, the
Jones concurrences are the best indicators of the Court's future
trajectory: to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in non-
content information like historical cell site data.
160
Casting the critical fifth vote to make the majority, Justice
Sotomayor's perspective is arguably the best indication of how the Court
will resolve post-Jones electronic surveillance cases like the one
analyzed here.'61 Indeed, it would not be unusual for a concurring
opinion regarding a novel Fourth Amendment issue ultimately to become
a cornerstone of constitutional jurisprudence.162  In her concurrence,
Justice Sotomayor clearly suggests that there is a reasonable expectation
of privacy in cell phone location information.63 As well, Justice Alito's
concurrence indicates a reasonable expectation of privacy in location
information.'64  These concurring opinions in Jones show that the
156. See supra Part II.A.
157. See Owsley, supra note 119, at 34.
158. See Jones v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012)(5-4 decision).
159. In fact, the lasting legacy of Justice Scalia's trespass theory reasoning is
questionable, given that his opinion narrowly became the majority by only one vote.
160. See Murphy, supra note 124, at 334-36 (stating that Justice Sotomayor's
opinion, in addition to being forward-thinking and open to a new approach to the Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, is the only Jones opinion "that contains any trace of
vision, even as she admits to struggling precisely with how to realize it").
161. Recall that Justice Harlan's famous reasonable expectation of privacy test
appeared in the concurring opinion in Katz. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
162. See Horwath, supra note 33, at 947; Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954-55,
957(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (writing that "the Fourth Amendment is not concerned
only with trespassory intrusions on property. Rather, even in the absence of a trespass, 'a
Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation
of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.' ... I for one doubt that people would
accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government" of the great deal
of information which people reveal about themselves in the digital age) (citation
omitted).
163. See Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring)(writing that "society's
expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not-and indeed, in
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Court's disposition is shifting toward recognizing a reasonable
expectation of privacy, even in the absence of a physical trespass, in
digital location information like historical cell site data.
In addition to the concurring opinions, a close reading of the Jones
majority opinion still indicates that recognizing a reasonable expectation
of privacy in cell site data is appropriate. Specifically, there are
important similarities between tracking someone's location with GPS
and with cell site data.165 While these two technologies are scientifically
different, they possess similar precision capabilities.166 Accordingly, "if
GPS tracking generates sufficient information to reveal an intimate
portrait of an individual's life, thereby requiring a warrant, then similar
information gathered by slightly different technological means must also
raise Fourth Amendment concerns."167  In essence, recognizing a
reasonable expectation of privacy in cell site location information is the
next logical extension of the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
C. The Inapplicability of the Third-Party Exception to the Warrant
Requirement
The third-party exception to the warrant requirement stands for the
proposition that a person cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in information that they voluntarily expose to third parties.168 However,
this doctrine must be adjusted to reflect "evolving technological
realities. ,1 69  Historical cell site information should receive Fourth
the main, simply could not-secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement" of
an individual, at least not for a prolonged period of time).
164. For instance, cell site data, like GPS data, narrows the geographic location of
cell phones at specific times, tracks a person's movement pattern, and is useful in
establishing the proximity of persons relative to crime scenes. See Thomas A. O'Malley,
Using Historical Cell Site Analysis Evidence in Criminal Trials, 59 U.S. AT'Y BULL. 16,
(2011), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ files/usao/legacy/2011/1l/30/usab5906.pdf.
As well, GPS and cell site data have the potential to provide precise information
revealing an individual's location within a residence that could otherwise not be
ascertained without a warrant, thereby violating the privacy of the home and the Court's
decision in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (holding that the warrantless GPS-
tracking of a beeper placed inside of a container and transported into Karo's home was
unconstitutional because Karo had an expectation of privacy in a private residence). See
Ross, supra note 116, at 1209.
165. See Elliott, supra note 117, at 4.
166. Id. at 3 (arguing that "obtaining cell site location data, whether historical or
prospective, should constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, just as installing a
GPS tracking device does").
167. See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435 (1976).
168. See Timothy Lee, Why the "Third Party Doctrine" Undermines Online Privacy
Protections, TECHIIRT, June 20, 2008,
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20080530/2014171272. shtml.
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Amendment protection, despite the fact that such information is
transmitted through intermediaries and is shared with more than one
person.
170
A strict application of third-party doctrine to historical cell site
information would be inappropriate because cell phone users do not
voluntarily surrender location information to a third-party in any
meaningful way.17' Even in the current age, it is unlikely that all cell
phone users are aware that their cell phone providers collect and store
historical location information.172 Although service contracts may
include a provision revealing this practice, it is unlikely that cell phone
users comb through a lengthy service agreement with great scrutiny.
173
Further, while the average cell phone user would likely be aware that a
cell phone typically possesses GPS capabilities, far fewer owners would
understand that a cell phone inherently tracks that user's location.174 In
fact, many users mistakenly believe that if they disable a cell phone's
GPS or location services that they have effectively gone off of the
grid.1 75 As this Comment previously noted,17 6 the fact that cell phone
usage is essentially unavoidable for an individual to participate in the
workforce of American society further aggravates the situation. 1
77
In addition to the reality that cell phone users do not surrender
historical cell site data to service providers in any "knowing" and
169. See Horwath, supra note 33, at 928.
170. There is a strong argument that an individual's privacy settings are the best
evidence of a person's reasonable expectation of privacy in information that the person
shares, as opposed to a strict application of the third-party doctrine. See Horwath, supra
note 33, at 951; Crispin v. Christian Adigier, 717 F.Supp. 2d 965, 991 (9th Cir.
201 0)(holding that Crispin's privacy settings were dispositive of whether Crispin had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his Facebook posts). But see Malone, supra note
147, at 739-40 (arguing that users do voluntarily and knowingly convey their location
information to service providers because: cell phone usage is sufficiently widespread to
make it common knowledge that service providers gather location data; users know that
the cost of service increases if they travel outside of their provider's territory, so users
therefore have constructive knowledge that their location is being recorded; and the fact
that cell phones automatically convey information does not outweigh the fact that this
information is a natural and necessary consequence of choosing to own and to use a cell
phone).
171. See In re United States for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commun. Serv.
to Disclose Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d, 304, 319 (3d Cir. 2010).
172. See Elliott, supra note 117, at 13.
173. Id. at 4.
174. See Brendan I. Koerner, Your Cellphone is a Homing Device, LEGAL AFFAIRS
(July/Aug. 2003), http://www. legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August 2003/feature koemer
julaug03.msp.
175. See supra Part I. See also supra note 138 and accompanying text.
176. See Elliott, supra note 117, at 34.
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"voluntary" manner, historical cell site data is not a business record178
either. 79  Unlike the information disclosed by bank records180 or pen
registers,18' "where it is clear that the person engaging in the transaction
knew that the transaction was being recorded, and that the transaction
was only a specific moment in time, 182 cell site location data is
continuously self-generated and reveals detailed information about a
person's communications, movements, and activities.83 This sensitive
information is precisely the kind of information that the U.S. Supreme
Court has previously said is subject to a reasonable expectation of
privacy.84  In the technological reality of today, it would contravene
177. The business record prong of the third-party doctrine exempts the government
from the warrant requirement for information that is obtains from a third party's business
records, reasoning that because this information was gathered by a third party for
legitimate business purposes, the government may compel these records on a lesser
standard than probable cause. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442, 448
(1976). For a discussion of why this doctrine warrants reexamination to properly account
for cell phone technology, see Orin Kerr & Greg Nojeim, The Data Question: Should the
Third-Party Records Doctrine Be Revisited?, ABA JOURNAL, Aug. 2012,
http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/article/the dataquestion_ should_ the third-
partyrecordsdoctrine be revisited/; United States v. Jones, 132 U.S. 945, 957 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring).
178. A recent article published by Harvard Law Review, explained that Congress
specifically declined to designate cell site location data as a normal business record. See
Recent Case, Fourth Amendment - Warrantless Searches - Fifth Circuit Upholds Stored
Communications Act's Nonwarrant Requirement For Cell site Data As Not Per Se
Unconstitutional. - In re Application of the United States For Historical Cell Site Data,
127 HARV. L. REv. 1220, 1226 (2014). See also 47 U.S.C. § 222(0(2006 & Supp. V
2011)("[A] customer shall not be considered to have approved the use or disclosure of or
access to cell phone location data."); 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1)(barring cell phone service
providers from disclosing "individually identifiable customer proprietary network
information" except as required by law or with customer approval).
179. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
180. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-45 (1979).
181. See Scott A. Fraser, Comment, Making Sense of New Technologies and Old
Law: A New Proposal for Historical Cell site Location Jurisprudence, 52 SANTA CLARA
L. REv. 571, 606 (2012).
182. See Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
the Affirmance of the District Court, In re Application of the United States Government
for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commun. to Disclose Records to the Gov't,
620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010)(No. 08-4227), 2009 WL 3866619(underscoring the fact that
"location data are not actively and voluntarily created by cell phone users, who likely
lack any knowledge of what location data their service providers record," in stark contrast
to bank records). See also Patrick T. Chamberlain, Note, Court Ordered Disclosure of
Historical Cell Site Location Information: The Argument for a Probable Cause Standard,
66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1275, 1286 (2009) (noting that the substance of cell site records
are different from the information voluntarily conveyed in Miller and Smith because cell
site information is collected without the user's knowledge and the data enables the user's
movements to be tracked on a relatively precise and continuous basis).
183. The Miller Court distinguished checks from confidential communications,
considering them "negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions." See
2015]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
logic, as well as the words of the Court,'85 to conclude that the mere
production of location data, or the records of such data, abrogates a
customer's reasonable expectation of privacy in cell site location
information.
186
The Court should avoid a strict application of the third-party
doctrine and adhere to the ideals proffered by Justice Sotomayor in
Jones. Justice Sotomayor's Jones concurrence suggested that the third-
party doctrine should not vitiate Fourth Amendment protection of
location information.8 7 Specifically, Sotomayor opined that
it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age,
in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves
to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. .. . I for
one doubt that people would accept without complaint the warrantless
disclosure to the Government of a list of every Web site they had
visited in the last week, or month, or year. . . . I would not assume
that [even] information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the
public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to
Fourth Amendment protection.
188
In addition to the words of Justice Sotomayor, even Justice Scalia
professed in his majority opinion that a non-trespassory electronic
surveillance would require the Court to employ an analysis other than the
third party doctrine.'89 To ignore the Court's clear instruction to analyze
Miller, 425 U.S. at 442. Moreover, in Miller a person took an affirmative, conscious step
to write a check, whereas cell site location information is automatically conveyed. See
Freiwald, supra note 34, at 734-36.
184. The Court stated in Miller that it must "examine the nature of the particular
documents sought to be protected in order to determine whether there is a legitimate
expectation of privacy concerning their contents." Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
185. See Freiwald, supra note 34, at 737. See also Recent Case, 127 HARV. L. REv.
1220, 1227 (2014) (concluding that "in the face of technological change, [the business
record doctrine] will have to give or else swallow privacy whole). But see Orin S. Kerr,
The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MIcH. L. REv. 561, 564 (2009)(defending a
strict application of the third party doctrine).
186. See Horwath, supra note 33, at 947.
187. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
188. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 923 (majority opinion) ("It may be that achieving the
same result through electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an
unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present case does not require us to answer
that question.... We may have to grapple with these 'vexing problems' in some future
case where a classic trespassory search is not involved and resort must be had to Katz
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historical cell site data under a framework other than strict third-party
doctrine undermines the Court's authority as well as the privacy that the
Founders sought to protect through the Fourth Amendment. 190
D. Probable Cause Is the Proper Standard to Impose On Law
Enforcement19'
Historical cell site data should be obtained pursuant to a probable
cause standard to guard against unwarranted disclosure of valuable,
intimate information.192  When closely examined, it is clear that the
disagreement between the Circuits over the proper legal standard to
impose on the government can be accredited to different understandings
of current cell phone data technology and the forms of data being
requested.1 93 Although some argue that cell site data is less accurate than
GPS data, the allegedly different levels of precision are rapidly
decreasing.
194
Even assuming that GPS data is in fact more precise than its cell site
counterpart, the richness of information gleaned from historical cell site
data raises other important concerns that more than make up for any lack
of precision.195  In fact, recent congressional hearings on the need to
update electronic surveillance laws focused on location data and revealed
that the precision of location data has increased dramatically, even
without the use of triangulation techniques of GPS technology.
196
analysis: but there is no reason for rushing forward to resolve them here.") (emphasis
added).
189. See Horwath, supra note 33, at 947. Moreover, while there has, admittedly,
been some opposition to applying a more relaxed version of the third-party doctrine in
order to properly account for technological advances, even a strict application of the
third-party doctrine would not indefinitely disentitle historical cell site information to
Fourth Amendment protections because "[a]s Katz and Smith both show, the mere fact
that an individual does not have a subjective expectation of privacy does not preclude
Fourth Amendment protections." See Recent Case, 127 HARV. L. REv. 1220, 1225
(2014). Indeed, "Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that the third-party doctrine may
not always by itself resolve the application of the Fourth Amendment to sensitive
information. Rather, courts must engage in a more difficult task, asking whether
government intrusion 'alters the relationship between citizen and government in a way
that is inimical to democratic society."' Id. at 1227.
190. For an overview of the arguments against imposing a probable cause standard
to protect cell site information, see Malone, supra note 147.
191. See Elliott, supra note 117, at 3; Owsley, supra note 119, at 44-45.
192. See Ross, supra note 116, at 1206.
193. See Elliott, supra note 117, at 4; Ross, supra note 116, at 1209 (noting that
historical cell site data has potential to achieve GPS-like accuracy).
194. See Freiwald, supra note 34, at 715.
195. See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act Reform and Revolution in
Location Based Technologies and Services: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
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Currently, each individual data point is becoming more and more
revealing on its own, and companies are collecting an increasing amount
of data. 197 This advanced state of modem surveillance technology
requires that courts treat requests for historical cell site data the same as
requests for GPS data vis-A-vis Fourth Amendment protections.
198
The growing similarities between GPS and cell site data make cell
site data an increasingly useful tool in criminal investigations.'99 For this
reason, millions of requests are made each year by the government for
data about cell phone customers.200  This practice has become so
common that, as a general practice, the Department of Justice provides to
their personnel a form application for 2703(d) orders.20 1 In fact, requests
for such information have become so voluminous that the government is
encouraged to put "URGENT" on requests in order to obtain information
promptly.
20 2
Law enforcement officials are not the only parties who find
historical cell site data extremely valuable. Some cell phone service
providers charge law enforcement fees to provide them with information
regarding a subscriber's account.20 3  In fact, this is a source of
considerable revenue for some of these providers.20 4 In order to
Cong. 27 (2010)(statement of Matt Blaze, Associate Professor of Computer and
Information Science, University of Pennsylvania). Congress noted, however, that both
triangulation and GPS are becoming increasingly prevalent in widely owned smartphones
today. Id.
196. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act Reform: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H.Comm. on the
Judiciary, 11lth Cong. 29-30 (2010) (statement of Albert Gidari, Partner, Perkins Coie
LLP) [hereinafter Statement of Albert Gidari]).
197. See Ross, supra note 116, at 1209.
198. See Owsley, supra note 119, at 22 (noting that the Department of Justice
advises federal aw enforcement officials that, in general, obtaining a court order for
historical cell site information could provide valuable leads in a criminal investigation);
Ross, supra note 116, at 1212 (explaining that as the accuracy of cell site technology
approaches that of GPS, cell site information may provide considerably more benefits to
law enforcement since no installation of a tracking device is required).
199. See Ellen Nakashima, Cellphone Carriers Report Surge in Surveillance
Requests From Law Enforcement, WASH. POST (July 9, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/national-security/cellphone-carriers-report-surge-
in-surveillance-requests/2012/07/09/gJQAVk4PYWstory.html.
200. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Electronic Surveillance Manual, 162-165 (2005),
http://www.justice.gov/ criminal/foia/docs/elec-sur-manual.pdf).
201. See Eric Lichtblau, Wireless Firms Are Flooded by Requests to Aid
Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/09/us/cell-
carriers-see-uptick-in-requests-to-aid-surveillance.html.
202. See 18 U.S.C. § 2706 (2006) (discussing cost reimbursement).
203. See Lichtblau, supra note 197; David Syndiongco & Will Oremus, How Much
Money Does Your Cellphone Company Make from Selling Your Data to Police?, SLATE
(July 19, 2012), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/07/19/
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capitalize on this lucrative opportunity, service providers are now
collecting increasing amounts of data that law enforcement finds
enticing.20 5 For instance, the government often seeks and is able to
compel disclosure of information on all calls handled by a particular
tower and not just those calls that pertain to the target cell phone user
alone.2 °6
Given the prevalence and utility of the government gathering
historical cell site data on cell phone users, and the benefits reaped by
service providers, it is counterintuitive for the judiciary not to oversee
this practice.20 7  Without the Court imposing a higher probable cause
requirement, there is a significant risk20 8 that law enforcement will abuse
cell site location data.209 Only the more demanding probable cause
standard will prevent the government from engaging in regular fishing
expeditions in criminal investigations.210 And, in reality, the probable
cause standard arguably serves the government's interests: by obtaining
cell site information only upon a showing of probable cause, courts will
exclude cell site evidence with significantly less frequency and more
convictions will be affirmed on appeal.211
celiphone spying-wireless-carriers-make-millions-tracking-customers-selling-data-to
_police.html (noting specifically that ATT collected $8.3 million in fees in 2011,
compared with just $2.8 million in 2007, and Verizon collected $3-5 million in each of
the last five years).
204. See Statement of Albert Gidari, supra note 192, at 29-30.
205. Id.
206. Consider Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in Jones, in which she expresses her
willingness to "consider the appropriateness of entrusting to the Executive, in the absence
of any oversight from a coordinate branch, a tool so amenable to misuse, especially in
light of the Fourth Amendment's goal to curb arbitrary exercises of police power."
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). See also
Freiwald, supra note 34, at 721 (arguing that trusting the government to monitor itself
and restrict the amount of information it seeks is counter to constitutional principles and
to experience).
207. A risk that justifies imposing a warrant requirement on the government. See
Freiwald, supra note 34, at 724.
208. See Elliott, supra note 117, at 32. See also Letter from Rena Y. Kim, Chief,
Freedom of Info./Privacy Unit, Office of Enforcement Operations, Criminal Div., to
Catherine Crump, Staff Attorney, Am. Civil Liberties Union Fund (June 1, 2009),
http://www.aclue.org/pdfs/freespeech/ 18cellfoia release CRM-200800622F_06012009.
pdf; United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 882-85 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting generally that
the "hidden, continuous, indiscriminate, and intrusive nature of electronic surveillance
raises the likelihood and ramification of law enforcement abuse").
209. See Freiwald, supra note 34, at 742, 747.
210. See Owsley, supra note 119, at 43 (discussing David J.R Frakt, Fruitless
Poisonous Trees in a Parallel Universe: Hudson v. Michigan, Knock-and-Announce, and
the Exclusionary Rule, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 659, 698 (2007)).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Court should impose the probable cause standard upon law
enforcement seeking to obtain historical cell site data collection. First,
Congress did not anticipate the location-tracking capability of modem
cell phones when it chose the specific and articulable fact standard for
the SCA. Second, the prevalence of cell phones and America's
dependence upon them compels the Court to recognize a reasonable
expectation of privacy in cell site data.
Besides these practical considerations, the Court's recent Jones and
Riley decisions evince its willingness to extend Fourth Amendment
protection to historical cell site data. Members of the Court have alluded
that an expectation of privacy in non-content cell phone information,
such as historical cell site data, remains reasonable despite the third-party
doctrine because, unlike information disclosed from bank records or pen
registers, cell site information is not knowingly or voluntarily conveyed
to a third-party and is not a normal business record. Indeed, extending
Fourth Amendment protection to historical cell site data is the next
logical step in the trajectory of the Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence-and, more importantly, is necessary to ensure that law
enforcement practices adequately respect the diminishing sphere of
privacy that remains in the lives of Americans today.
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